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 1 
Abstract 
 
This article addresses the consequences of Washington Consensus, and more recently post-
Washington Consensus policy for democratic good governance in Africa. It acknowledges 
the increased focus in recent years of policy-makers on poverty as an important force in 
world politics. Despite this increased concern we argue that International Relations as a 
discipline, fails to offer a suitable framework for understanding poverty as a social force. The 
article proposes a revival of Robert W. Cox and Jeffrey Harrod’s approach based on ‘patterns 
of social relations of production’. This offers a disaggregation of the condition that is often 
referred to in the literature as ‘the poor’ or ‘the informal sector’. We then outline a 
comparative research agenda based on the cases of Tunisia and South Africa. The article 
demonstrates how these cases provide the sternest test for assessing our scepticism of the 
prospects of reconciling market-led development with good governance, whilst also offering 
a ‘most-different’ comparison given their very different political cultures. In conclusion, we 
reflect on the methodological aspects to operationalising such a research agenda and propose 
an ethnographic approach informed by the work of Burawoy. 
 
Keywords: Poverty, Good Governance, Social Forces, South Africa, Tunisia. 
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Introduction 
 
This article is concerned with addressing the social question of global poverty that has been 
raised with regards to neo-liberal, market-led models of development, as articulated in the 
1980s and the 1990s through the ‘Washington Consensus’. This question, first raised in 19th 
century Europe during the era of industrialization, refers in broad terms to the political 
consequences of the socio-economic inequality that is endemic to the current phase of global 
capitalism. It has recently been resurrected from the political margins and become 
increasingly central to the policy mainstream. The Washington Consensus has in many cases 
exacerbated the extreme conditions that people living in poverty endure. This article outlines 
an approach that provides the basis for a sustained analysis of the nature, social content and 
political directions taken by social forces and agents that arise from the adverse social 
conditions descriptively referred to as ‘poverty’ in developing societies, shaped by the 
legacies of Washington Consensus policies. In doing so the article seeks to highlight the 
relationship between social forces and international order. 
 
In the immediate post-Cold War phase of triumphalist liberalism, Walrasian general 
equilibrium was held not only to become prevalent in the economic sphere, but also would 
express itself as liberal-democratic/pluralist/polyarchical  harmony in the political and civil 
societal spheres as a Hegelian ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989). Huntington’s (1984, 1993)  
more pessimistic and competing hypothesis of globalisation provoking a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ has, however, increasingly eclipsed the liberal-triumphalist view, not least in 
the wake of 9/11 and the war on terror. However, Huntington’s cultural-essentialist 
conception has been criticised, and it is increasingly acknowledged that the politics that 
Huntington describes may have important socio-economic determinants in the persistence of 
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poverty in the Third World. This view is even held among prominent supporters of neo-
liberalism, such as Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (2002). Bildt gives a lot of credence 
to Huntington’s thesis, but he does not see ‘the political implosions and social explosions’ as 
inherent in a culture, but rather as the effect of socio-economic variables such as population 
growth and profile, the lack of economic growth, and declining standards of living. As 
Jeffrey Harrod (2006) makes clear, Bildt is by no means alone in his return to the ‘fear’ of the 
disorderly and potentially violent ‘mass’ that has occurred among ruling circles from time to 
time.1 
 
It is not only those who fear the masses from a security perspective who attribute political 
agency to the global poor. At the opposite end of the normative spectrum, critical theorists 
suggest that ‘they’ constitute an agency for dialectical change (Gill 1996, Davis 2006). 
Similar conclusions are behind the premises of reformers of the global development and 
governance agendas (e.g. UNDP 1999) who have prompted moves towards a ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’, whereby market-led reform is flanked by the compensatory 
measures of democracy promotion as well as policies intended for poverty reduction and 
preventative security (e.g. UN Millennium Development Goals). Hence, the post-Washington 
Consensus can be understood as an attempt to introduce measures to offset the potentially 
negative political consequences of global poverty (see Gamble 2006, Robison 2006).  
 
Yet although there seems to be a broad agreement of the importance of poverty as a social 
force of world politics, none of these perspectives offer a sustained and credible account as to 
why poverty might be such a social force. As Harrod puts it, then, there seems to be a broad 
agreement across the normative spectrum that 
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...the poor are either a threat or a force for change…what is needed is an analytical 
framework or approach that can help show why this is the case. Such an approach 
might also reveal the nature of the political attitudes, consciousness and forms of 
action of poor populations and the trajectories that social and political action might 
take (Harrod 2006: 39). 
 
Poverty, Social Forces and International Relations: Shortcomings of the Discipline 
 
Despite the increased concern with the impact of poverty on world politics, International 
Relations as a discipline, is ill-equipped to deal with the phenomenon due to its 
underdeveloped conceptions of the social determinants of world politics. Whilst it has been 
recognised for some time that the rise of non-state actors has rendered the neo-realist ‘third 
image’ analytical abstraction inadequate2, the main analytical frameworks on offer are only 
helpful to a limited extent. Most analyses remain confined within the broad frame set by 
Keohane and Nye’s ‘complex interdependence’ theory (1977) which in effect defines away 
questions of antagonisms and power in the realm of civil society. Antagonisms and power are 
seen as confined to the inter-state realm (still conceived of in neo-realist terms) whereas civil 
society is assumed to contain a Pareto-optimal, positive sum, pluralist politics of allocation. 
 
Despite their contributions in other respects, this is also symptomatic of liberal 
constructivism, and the global civil society literature (e.g. Ruggie 1998, Archibugi et. al. 
1998). Postcolonial and feminist literatures have partially redressed these limitations through 
their analyses of power relations in the cultural sphere and their effect on identity formation 
(e.g. Said 1993, Marchand and Runyan 2000), but generally lack a rigorous analysis of how 
these power relations are produced, reproduced and refracted in the context of material 
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circumstances. Whilst especially the feminist literature is cognisant of the complex 
interaction between economy and culture, analysis of varied power relations of production 
tends to be substituted for descriptive and overly generalised categories such as ‘the informal 
sector’ (e.g. Staudt 1998). The ‘informal sector’ category is a purely empty-negative term 
which defines matters exclusively in terms of what they are not (not formal), rather than 
attempting to understand that to which it refers on its own terms. Historical materialist 
theories tend to rely on equally descriptive, stylized and empty-negative concepts when 
concrete lived experiences of ‘the poor’ do not - as is often the case - conform to the abstract 
categories of the industrial proletariat or the peasantry (such as the ‘lumpenproletariat’, the 
‘underclass’ and indeed the ‘informal proletariat’ (Davis 2006) or ‘the multitude’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2000)). More broadly, this reflects the privileging in historical materialism of the 
analysis of ruling classes and elites as agents of socio-political change as opposed to the 
subaltern (e.g. Brenner 1977, Gill 1990, Rosenberg 1994, Teschke 2003, van der Pijl 2006). 
 
Research in area studies, political sociology and anthropology into social movements and 
‘street politics’ may contribute to some extent to an understanding of poverty as a source of 
world politics. Bayat (2002), for instance, moves beyond a stylized conception of ‘poverty’ to 
a more nuanced conception of the social impacts of structural adjustment policies in the 
Middle East, and how this has generated particular kinds of mobilisation in civil society. 
Whilst structural adjustment may not have resulted in increases in poverty in absolute and 
aggregate terms, it has increased inequality, unemployment, and it has tended to undermine 
patrimonial-protective welfare policies as well as traditional-agrarian social relations. In other 
words, populations have become increasingly exposed to life-risks whilst the opportunities 
and scope for autonomous social mobilisation have increased due to the retreat of the 
regulatory capacities of the state. In a context shaped by the ‘retreat’ of the state and a rise of 
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the ‘informal sector’, mass protest and trade unionism have proven to be increasingly 
ineffective vehicles of activism whilst community activism has been feeble. Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) activism and social Islam have been more effective, but 
partial, in the problems they address, whilst ‘quiet encroachment’ (defined as ‘direct action of 
individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives in a quiet, unassuming, 
illegal fashion’) is ascendant on an increasingly urban and atomised social terrain.  
 
The sort of research pursued by Bayat provides a useful contribution, but it can be 
complemented by a framework based on the work of Robert Cox and Jeffrey Harrod in two 
important respects.3 First, his research also refers to the problematic concept of the ‘informal 
sector’ and can be put on a more analytically rigorous footing by the power relations of 
production approach. Second, the Cox-Harrod framework provides an approach through 
which one can articulate more clearly the linkages between the local and the global, through 
what we call below ‘the extended case method’. Having reviewed the weaknesses of the 
discipline of International Relations in being able to understand the role that social forces 
play in defining world order, our next task is to provide an elaboration of a revised version of 
the Cox-Harrod framework. 
 
The Cox-Harrod Framework 
 
The approach proposed here follows Robert W. Cox’s analysis of social forces as the source 
and foundation of world politics. As is generally recognised, Cox sees the dynamics of world 
politics as emanating from historic structures consisting of interacting material capabilities 
(productive and destructive potentials), ideas (intersubjective meanings and collective 
images) and institutions, operating at the interrelated spheres of action of social relations of 
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production, forms of state (state-civil society complexes) and world order (Cox 1981). What 
is generally overlooked is the role this approach assigns to social relations of production. This 
is no doubt in part because of Cox’s explicit foundations in Gramscian theory, emphasizing 
the ideological contingency of subject formation and the constitution of hegemonic order and 
challenge, which has gained resonance in an age influenced by constructivist and post-
structuralist currents. However, whilst it is valid to emphasize ideational contingency in the 
work of both Gramsci and Cox, it is just as important to recognise that for them material 
practices and production nevertheless are important for subject and order formation. Whilst 
the latter cannot be ‘read-off’ material practices and production in a reductionist way, what 
Gramsci calls the ‘economic-corporate moment’ (1971: 181) nevertheless does provide an 
uneven terrain of potential articulations, as particular material experiences generate 
dispositions and elective affinities with particular ideological and cultural forms (see also 
Bourdieu 1977). 
 
For Gramsci, the ‘economic-corporate moment’ is a ‘refractory reality’ where a ‘tradesman 
feels obliged to stand by another tradesman… but in the case of the wider social group this is 
not yet so’ (1971: 181). In other words, broader class-categories, such as ‘the bourgeoisie’ or 
the ‘working class’ are to be understood as a form of political subjectivity fundamentally 
dependent on politico-ideological articulations, whilst shared experience at the level of social 
relations of production only generate common dispositions at the more disaggregate class-
fractional level. It is an underestimated contribution by Cox (1987) and Harrod (1987) that 
they developed a more thought-through conception of how the ‘economic corporate moment’ 
should be understood and that they provided a way to relate this to world politics. We 
propose that the question of ‘poverty’ should be recast in these terms. 
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For Cox and Harrod the primordial dispositions of the ‘economic corporate moment’ are 
formed by power relations that people dialectically confront in their struggle over material 
survival. Power should in this context be understood in a broad sense as entailing material as 
well as ideational and institutional factors (such as the rationalities legitimating particular 
productive orders and institutions that reproduce these). Proceeding from identifying the 
varied power relations of production, they disaggregate the world’s working population on 
the basis of ‘patterns of social relations of production’, which generates a typology as 
accounted for in Table 1.4 As can be noted, the Marxian category of ‘proletarian’ features in 
the ‘enterprise pattern’, but empty-negative categories such as ‘Lumpenproletariat’ and 
‘informal’ labour has been assigned analytical-positive identities – and have been 
disaggregated – through types such as ‘self employment’ and the ‘casual’ pattern. 
 
** Insert Table 1 Here ** 
 
The condition that others refer to as the ‘global poor’, ‘informal sector’, ‘the underclass’, or 
the ‘multitude’, actually entails a variety of patterns of social relations of production, with 
radically different implications for dispositions of consciousness and mobilization. Hence, it 
is essential to disaggregate these social relations and classify them. To what extent is it the 
peasant pattern that is prevalent, as opposed to the self-employment pattern or the casual 
pattern, or the enterprise pattern (the proletarian condition as analyzed by Marx) or the 
household pattern? Given the highly varied power relations that are confronted in these 
production patterns, they generate highly varied modes of lived experience and dispositions 
of consciousness and mobilisation.  
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However, whilst the Cox-Harrod framework is highly suggestive and promising for a study of 
‘poverty’ as a source of world politics, we lack a sustained empirical analysis that is informed 
by this framework5 or a systematic attempt to falsify or verify the structure of hypotheses 
contained in it. Indeed, we lack an adequate reconstruction of data for these purposes. In the 
rest of this article we set out a potential research agenda that we think can meet some of these 
challenges.  
 
Defining Scope and Case Studies: Comparing Tunisia and South Africa 
 
Our over-riding question is what is the composition of production patterns in the Third 
World, in the context of the post-Washington Consensus, and what are the implications for 
world politics? However, we narrow this question in two ways. First, in terms of the political 
impact of different patterns of production relations, we are primarily concerned with the 
viability or otherwise of democratic good governance in a post-Washington Consensus policy 
environment. Here, the Cox-Harrod framework suggests two key hypotheses: that self-
employment lends itself to populist authoritarian politics6, and that the casual pattern lends 
itself to an oscillation between the extreme instrumentalism of survival and millennialism?7 If 
these hypotheses are proved correct, they carry important implications for the prospects for 
democratic good governance. If not, might the framework be parsimoniously modified to 
offer a compelling understanding of world politics anyway, or should the framework be 
abandoned? 
 
Second, we narrow this question by focussing on two case-studies. The African continent 
provides numerous potential case-studies for such a research agenda. We propose to address 
the question of poverty, and the manner in which poverty generates dispositions of socio-
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political force, by focusing on Tunisia and South Africa and asking whether post-Washington 
Consensus policies as practiced by the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and the 
Tunisian and South African governments, are likely to be adequate in reconciling economic 
growth with democratic good governance. 
 
Tunisia is generally seen as the rare ‘success-story’ in post-Washington Consensus 
development policy (European Commission 2007a). As such it sets the sternest possible test 
for our own scepticism about the prospects of reconciling a market-oriented development 
model with good governance. Given the relative ‘success’ of economic development in 
Tunisia, if we can find evidence of the salience of the self-employment and casual production 
patterns and their hypothesized effects here, following Eckstein’s (1976) conception of a 
‘critical case’, there are good grounds to suppose that these forces will be at work in other 
cases too. In the sub-Saharan setting, as its most developed economy, South Africa shares 
this attribute with Tunisia and is hence eminently comparable. 
 
However, if the similarities that make Tunisia and South Africa comparable are important, 
their differences are even more valuable. Given the radically different political cultures of 
Tunisia and South Africa together they also constitute the basis of a ‘most-different’ 
comparison. In other words, if similar outcomes prove to be present in the two cases, despite 
radical differences of political culture, we are likely to be able to ‘distil’ (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970) the necessary and sufficient determinants of these conditions. Again, the 
comparison is ideally set up to test the Cox-Harrod hypothesis of similarities of dispositions 
arising out of similar power relations in production patterns notwithstanding politico-
ideological and cultural variations. 
 
 11 
Tunisia 
 
Tunisian Washington Consensus policies originated with its 1986 application to the IMF and 
attendant Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), culminating in the 1993 adoption of the 
IMF Article of Agreement VIII, a liberalisation of trade and ultimately membership in GATT 
and full currency convertibility. But convergence with transnational neoliberalism has a 
decisively regional dimension in the Tunisian case, given the importance of the EU and 
particularly the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.8 Tunisia was the first EMP country to conclude an Association 
Agreement (AA) with the EU in July 1995. In measures that should be seen against the 
backdrop of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the dismantling of the Lomé 
Convention9, the AA phased in free trade in industrial products over a 12 year period, 
extending preferential access to EU markets in exchange for reciprocal and complete 
dismantling of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to industrial imports from the EU. 
Furthermore, the AA has facilitated comprehensive harmonisation of norms and regulations, 
phasing out monopolistic practices, government subsidies and privileged grants to state 
enterprises. This is flanked by EU financial support for ‘adjustment and development efforts’ 
in the shape of the European Mediterranean Initiative and funds under the auspices of the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument aimed at facilitating ‘political and security dialogue’, 
cooperation in the areas sorting under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar and ‘social, cultural 
and humanitarian partnership’. These compensatory measures indicate that EU policy is now 
more in line with post-Washington Consensus policy. 
 
Tunisia is held up as the ‘master pupil’ amongst the Middle East and North African (MENA) 
Countries. However, whilst its average annual growth rates of about 4-5 percent and relative 
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macroeconomic stability are often construed as a ‘success story’ (European Commission 
2007a), studies have shown that there is no positive linear correlation between economic 
growth in Tunisia and the reduction of poverty and the improvement of human development 
indicators (see FEMISE 2004, UNDP 2002). Even enthusiastic supporters of liberalisation 
policies, such as IMF economists Jbili and Enders, warned that the benefits would be 
‘negligible’ if Tunisia’s AA with the EU resulted in a ‘hub and spoke effect’ whereby 
investors choose Europe as the site of production for the Tunisian market (1996: 19). The 
European Commission (2007a) has also stated that levels of investment and gross fixed 
capital formation are a serious cause for concern and even official unemployment rates 
remain stubbornly high at 14-16 percent. Indeed, at about 4 percent, Tunisian annual average 
growth rates are estimated by the Commission to be about 2 percent too low to actually 
decrease unemployment (European Commission 2007a: 7). 
 
This speaks volumes about the social effects resulting from a large proportion of youths 
entering working age, labour-shedding as state-corporatist enterprises adjust to market 
competition and state employment being reduced (Farsakh 2000, FEMISE 2004). In addition 
we have seen privatization in the agrarian sector with transfers of land from cooperatives to 
large landowners (King 1999, 2003). This is a process that David Harvey (2003) has called 
the ‘political economy of dispossession’, displacing rural populations from agrarian forms of 
subsistence.10 And indeed, Tunisia has not been immune to the growth of urban slums such 
as Tunis’ southern fringe (Ettadhamen, Mellassine and Djebel Lahmar) (Davis, 2006: 25, 
109). And although the poverty rate, measured in terms of the $1 a day indicator, has fallen, 
this is most likely just a reflection of an increased role of cash in the economy due to the 
decline of the agrarian sector as a proportion of the workforce. It is widely acknowledged that 
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‘poverty’ and social dislocations are serious concerns in Tunisia. These developments have 
ominous consequences for the prospects of democratic development. 
 
Yet, symptomatic of much of comparative and political economy (Amoore 2006), there are 
serious deficits in the literature on Tunisia as the analytical focus remains on elites and the 
‘subaltern’ are conceptualised in unhelpfully stylized categories. The concern in question can 
in fact be characterised by a consensus view that unites neo-Weberians with neo-Marxists: a 
‘praetorian’11 political elite occupying the structures of the partrimonial state generating rents 
from a private sector, which in Tunisia is reliant on world markets. The EMP and mise a 
niveau represents an adjustment of tactics for the securing of such accumulation, but it does 
not represent a major transformation of this state form. In turn, the ‘bourgeoisie’ is 
economically dependent on selective benefits and policies of the state for their economic 
activities, creating a system of selective and personality-based/group-specific links of 
benefits and obligations. These linkages are also extended selectively to ‘workers’, through 
corporatist unions and to ‘peasants’ in exchange for loyalty to the praetorian elite. One of the 
effects of structural adjustment has been to narrow the scope of distribution to the latter, 
opening up the space for political contestation by ‘Islamist’ counter-elites. This in turn has 
prompted the need for more repressive policies (Murphy 2001, 2006: 523-24, Ayubi 1995, 
Bellin 2002).  
 
In this consensus view, structural adjustment and other market-promoting reforms do not 
transform these relations, then, but is rather refracted through them. King (1999) illustrates 
vividly how structural adjustment and patrimonialism operates symbiotically on the 
countryside, as the sell-off of state lands lead to a dismantling of cooperatives and purchases 
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of landowners with favourable connections to the state, whilst not resulting in a more 
efficient use of these lands. 
 
Such modes of analysis take us some way towards understanding the social relations to which 
the state adjusts itself, through a mix of measures that combine consent and coercion. 
However, it only goes so far in terms of understanding the motivations and political 
dispositions of those who are excluded and marginalized. As a result, it is difficult to assess 
the regime’s claim that authoritarianism is necessary for socio-political stability and security 
(including European security). In other words, there is a lacunae in our understanding of the 
relationship between ‘economic forms’ and ‘political forms’, because there is a gap in our 
understanding of the dispositions of political agency of social forces that are assumed to be a 
threat to social order. This literature provides no clear answer as to whether they are likely to 
be socially integrated through democratic politics, or what kind of economic reforms would 
be required to make their socio-political dispositions democratic. Hence we are back at the 
analytical lacunae identified by the citation of Harrod (2006) in the introduction to this article 
and one of the crucial places where we think the Cox-Harrod framework can be useful. 
 
The second strand in the existing literature does focus on emerging political identities but 
from a constructivist standpoint. One example is Frederic Volpi’s useful analysis of the 
political situation in the Islamic world (2004a, 2004b). Unlike Huntington, Volpi is 
cogniscent of the non-monolithic, dynamic and social dimensions of Islamic discourse (e.g. 
Pasha and Samatar 1995, Cox 1995). However, it is also an approach that does not reduce 
international norms to a teleology where liberal regimes are assumed to progressively unfold 
towards a Kantian ‘perpetual peace’ cum Deutschean12 ‘security community’ just because 
communicative linkages are established. Volpi (2004b) offers his own account of the ‘forms 
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of life’ of prevailing norms in MENA societies, based on linguistic pragmatism (as pioneered 
by the late Wittgenstein and Winch). For Volpi, the introduction of liberal norms through 
various international regimes is interacting with indigenous ‘life forms’ (‘Republican’ and 
‘Islamic’ conceptions) so as to nurture different and competing conceptions of democracy 
(understood as ‘majority rule’).13 These norms may ally with liberal conceptions in struggle 
and negotiation with one another, producing a stalemate which Volpi calls ‘pseudo-
democracy’. Central in this context are the concepts of assibiyya – tribal ‘group-feeling’ that 
has been central to praetorianism and that finds its modern expression in Arab nationalism 
and ummah – the community of the faithful, informing Islamic conceptions of democracy. 
Given that the tension between these conceptions generates perceived or real security 
problems for western powers, it also means that the liberal democratic conception adjusts to 
the ‘pragmatic articulation of opportunities’ and hence reinforces the ‘pseudo-democratic’ 
constellation (hence the discrepancy between the western ideal of democracy and the 
concrete western policies pursued). 
 
Insofar as semiotics – whether in its (post-) structuralist or pragmatist variants – has 
persuasively argued that socio-political subjects cannot be ‘read-off’ the socio-economic 
positions in terms of a necessary causal link between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, the 
constructivist dimension must be taken seriously.14 Volpi’s analysis does also suggest that it 
is simplistic and reductionist to assume that socio-economic position determines fully formed 
socio-political subjects that merely draw on group-feeling and religion to advance their fully 
formed material interests, as if group and religious norms, as such, had no causal power at all 
in the determination of subject identity. However, this does not mean that norms can be 
treated as ontologically primitive variables, nor that they are completely malleable and 
without any regard to the socio-economic, which shapes the uneven terrain of potential 
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subject-articulations. Whilst subject identity cannot be ‘read off’ production, it is important to 
remember that they themselves need to be produced. Volpli himself concedes as much when 
he concludes that the ‘outcome of ideological oppositions …are also grounded in pragmatic 
socioeconomic choices and opportunities’ (2004b: 1073). However, he offers no views with 
regard to how these socio-economic choices and opportunities should be understood. His 
pragmatic ‘life-forms’ seem to exist as surrealist statues in the desert, with no account of the 
material conditions of emergence (or production) and survival (or reproduction).  
 
The Cox-Harrod framework can provide a basis from which to meet the deficiencies of these 
two literatures. On the on hand, it allows for greater nuance and attention to the different 
political subjectivities of subaltern groups than is allowed for in the neo-Weberian/neo-
Marxist accounts. On the other hand, it allows for a better understanding of the material 
production and reproduction of different subjectivities than is possible from within the 
constructivist approach. The challenge here is to grasp the over-determined relationship 
between the material and the ideational, where we accept that subject formation is the 
outcome of a contingent logic of discursive articulation, but that we also accept that social 
subjects depend on socio-economic relations. 
 
South Africa 
 
After the end of apartheid, South Africa initially followed a model of development broadly in 
line with the Washington Consensus and in recent years the post-Washington Consensus. An 
early indication of the neo-liberal model was evident in South Africa’s negotiations with the 
EU that began in 1995 and culminated in a Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement 
(TDCA), which became operational at the start of 2000. The South African government saw 
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the TDCA as an important factor in encouraging the further integration of post-apartheid 
South Africa into the world economy (Lee 2002: 81). Former Director-General of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, described how the TDCA would be positive 
both in terms of increasing the flows of trade, investment and technology into South Africa 
and in enhancing productivity and stimulating exports, leading to economic growth (Erwin 
2000: vii). As Hurt has suggested previously ‘it is clear that in its relations with the EU, the 
South African government was in broad acceptance of the neo-liberalism that dominates the 
world’s multilateral institutions (Hurt 2006: 101). Such a position has also been reflected in 
domestic policy formulation within South Africa. The shift from the more Keynesian-inspired 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1996 is the most obvious example. 
 
More recently the EU’s strategy towards South Africa has shifted towards the post-
Washington Consensus. There is still a faith in the liberalisation of the economy but the state 
is given a complementary role in providing both education and an infrastructure conducive to 
economic growth. This approach is reflected in the Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
(European Commission 2007b) and the associated Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-
2013 (MIP) for South Africa (European Commission 2007c). The focus on poverty 
alleviation is made very clear. The Country Strategy Paper outlines how Europe will focus on 
three main areas of development cooperation with South Africa: 
1. To promote pro-poor, sustainable economic growth. 
2. To improve the capacity and provision of basic services for the poor. 
3. To promote good governance. (European Commission 2007b: 30). 
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Again such a position has been matched by recent developments in domestic policy-making. 
In February 2006 the South African government launched its Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). The aim of AsgiSA is to halve poverty and 
unemployment by 2014. It is not a new policy as such, and the basic method for achieving 
these aims remains the GEAR and its emphasis on growth first and foremost. What AsgiSA 
highlights is some of the constraints that have hindered progress in achieving high enough 
levels of economic growth. It focuses on economic infrastructure (road, railways, electricity, 
water, etc.) and social infrastructure (schools, housing, health provision, etc.). It also focuses 
on the lack of skills by targeting both schooling and training programmes. 
 
GEAR presented a highly optimistic scenario regarding job creation, caused by private 
investment via economic growth. Whilst prioritising macroeconomic stability over other 
objectives, GEAR was certainly conceived as a means of addressing poverty through the 
boosting of business formation and employment through multiplier and accelerator effects. 
Hence, GEAR set very ambitious targets - and painted a highly optimistic scenario - for job 
creation and economic growth, almost wholly dependent on the performance of the private 
sector (Department of Finance 1996: 6). Whilst the macroeconomic stabilisation record is 
broadly consistent with the GEAR strategy, however, not even the most ardent supporters of 
GEAR can deny that the record on investment and growth has been disappointing and that the 
record on employment has been nothing short of disastrous (Trevor Manuel cited in Streak 
2004: 278). Ominous social consequences of the economic strategy and its failure to meet 
growth and employment objectives are also intimated in the literature. It has been suggested 
that ‘apart from the ethically odious (and increasingly dangerous) prospect of living in one of 
the world’s most unequal economies, such a polarised environment is fertile ground for social 
and political instability’ (Williams and Taylor 2000: 37). Yet, consistent with the argument 
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made earlier in this article none of these studies contain a rigorous analysis of how these 
adverse conditions might actually translate into a political agency of ‘the poor’. 
 
However, Spiess’ (2004) contributes in a significant way towards a rigorous formulation of 
the problematic, clearly influenced by neo-Marxist as well as neo-Weberian theory on state 
autonomy. South Africa faces the classical contradiction involved in promoting the 
conditions for capital accumulation while maintaining political legitimacy. In this situation, 
many post-colonial states have resorted to patrimonial and populist clientelism as the 
requisite state autonomy from the ‘clamour of special interests’ is absent. Given the popular 
support for the ANC and its efforts to strike a principled distributive bargaining framework 
(with business and organised labour in the ‘tripartite alliance’) it may be possible to assert a 
state autonomy that nevertheless is still ‘socially embedded’ (hence relying on ‘infrastructural 
power’ rather than ‘coercive power’). The question here is whether it is possible to keep the 
heterogeneous social coalition of interests that constitute the ANC movement together within 
an effective socio-economic paradigm of governance (Spiess 2004: 140-41). Indeed, the 
debate within the tripartite alliance, between the government elites and COSATU over 
economic policy can be seen exactly as expressing tensions in this coalition. Yet, the process 
of subject formation that may be engendered by the social antagonisms related to poverty and 
inequality still remains a ‘black box’ in Spiess’ analysis. 
 
Spiess’ point of arrival is the point of departure for social movement analysis. Ballard et. al. 
(2005, see also Desai 2003) offer a panoramic review both of the literature on social 
movements in South Africa as well as of empirical developments in the post-GEAR era after 
the mid-1990s. They affirm a realignment of social forces, where a set of social movements 
and organisations have been formed outside the ANC and state structures, ‘overwhelmingly’ 
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due to ‘worsening poverty, with struggles addressing both labour issues and consumption 
issues’ though ‘some’ movements also address ‘social exclusion in terms of gender, sexuality 
and citizenship that sit at the intersection of recognition and redistribution’ (Ballard et. al. 
2005: 615). No doubt, this literature has significant descriptive value. Yet, even though it is 
unanimous on the importance of ‘poverty’ for these social movements, it lacks any serious 
attempt to develop an analytical framework that links the lived experience of these adverse 
material conditions to dispositions of subject-formations, modes of political consciousness 
and power mobilisation. The lack of analysis is substituted with blanket descriptions such as 
‘poverty’, ‘the poor(s)’ as if this is a meaningful aggregation of lived experiences that 
generate subject formation, or alternatively by empty conceptual negations. This is a problem 
that has rightly been identified by post-structuralists, who point to the complex nature of 
subject formation and the problematic issues involved in intellectual representation of the 
‘subaltern’ (e.g. Howarth 1998, Walsh 2008).  
 
Yet, post-structuralism and constructivism cannot be read in the South African case in such a 
way as to suggest that material conditions do not matter. There seems to be a consensus that 
‘poverty’ is a key context for social mobilisation. Walsh’s (2008) (auto-) critique, pointing to 
the importance of a more differentiated approach to ‘poverty’, which acknowledges the 
problematic and socially constructed nature of that concept for ‘governmentality’ purposes, 
seems apt indeed. Yet whilst her reflections on the problem of ‘power effects’ (pace Burawoy 
1998) inherent in intellectual representation in ‘action-based’ ethnographic research is spot 
on, she does not herself contribute to an analytical frame which differentiates the lived 
experiences of those that categories such as ‘the poor’ seek to capture. As with the case of 
Tunisia, we suggest that the Cox-Harrod framework provides the means with which to 
address these weaknesses.  
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Conclusions: A New Research Agenda 
 
This article has argued that despite the increased recognition of ‘poverty’ for world politics, 
there is a lack of conceptual and methodological rigour in the way that the literature deals 
with it. We have pursued this argument on descending levels of abstraction, commencing 
with a discussion of the general state-of-the-art in International Relations. Thereby we made 
our general case for revisiting Cox and Harrod’s conception of patterns of social relations of 
production. It was our argument that this facilitated a more disaggregated and nuanced 
analysis than suggested by the descriptive, over-generalising term poverty, by providing a 
judicious analysis of the complex interaction of the material and ideational in subaltern 
subject formation. We then proceeded to concretise our case through a reflection on the 
literature on the situation in Tunisia and South Africa that we have identified as constituting a 
critical two-case comparison. 
 
Using the revised version of the Cox-Harrod framework outlined above we hope to 
demonstrate a much deeper understanding of the political consequences of the socio-
economic effects of Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus policy. There 
will be problems operationalising such a research agenda but we think these can be overcome 
by employing a more formalised ethnographic method informed by Michael Burawoy’s 
‘extended case method’ (1998). This is an approach that is not exclusive to Tunisia and South 
Africa as one could conceive of it being used in many different situations. 
 
The first step entails a reconstruction of demographic data to map the populations of Tunisia 
and South Africa in terms of the power/production relations they encounter in their struggle 
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for survival. This is a challenge because the available statistical categories are not geared 
towards capturing power/production relations. Nevertheless, exploratory studies have 
indicated that rough proxies can be reconstructed from especially ILO data and to a lesser 
extent UNDP data (Ryner 2006). We expect that national and local statistics in the cases 
under consideration would enhance the prospects for doing so and to reconstruct a 
comparable data-set in the two cases. Leysens (2006) has also demonstrated that the 
Afrobarometer survey can be used for this purpose. 
 
This data should provide the basis for identifying fields for more intensive qualitative 
research. As we have argued in this article, in both Tunisia and South Africa there are large 
incidences of ‘urban poverty’ – populations that are neither no longer peasants nor have been 
integrated into anything that resembles a labour market. We are particularly interested in 
disaggregating these populations, deploying the revised Cox-Harrod categories such as the 
‘casual pattern’ and ‘self employment’. Having identified fields, probably in sites such as 
Tunis’ southern fringe and Kayamandi in the Western Cape of South Africa, we will conduct 
narrative interviews with populations inhabiting these power/production patterns and use 
discourse analytical techniques to interpret the material. Here we are not primarily interested 
in content analysis, which no doubt will be highly saturated with cultural contingencies. 
Instead, combining Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Foucault’s concept of episteme, we are 
interested in finding out how a discourse needs to be structured in a certain setting to be taken 
seriously. We are interested in testing the Cox-Harrod claim that there is a correspondence 
between these discourses and the power/production patterns inhabited and that these 
transgress the specificities of culture. We would then seek to triangulate the material gathered 
with semi-structured interviews with state agencies and social movements about the 
constraints, prospects and strategies that might be deployed in effectively regulating or 
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mobilising the populations in question. Together these two forms of research should 
contribute to a better understanding of the factors determining what kind of agencies might 
emerge from ‘poverty’ in a post-Washington Consensus world in general and the prospects 
for democratic good governance in particular. 
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Table 1: Patterns of Social Relations of Production 
Pattern of Social Relations of Production Brief Description 
Corporate The workforce demonstrates loyalty to the 
corporations they work for due to protection 
schemes (e.g. company insurance) and 
strategies to integrate workers into the aims 
of the firm. 
Tripartism Workers belong to trade unions and tripartite 
bargaining takes place between the state, 
firms and trade unions. 
Enterprise Here the conditions for workers are not 
greatly affected by trade unions or 
government legislation, but are directly 
subject to the discipline of the market.  
State Corporatism In this pattern it is the power of the state that 
rules over both management and workers. 
Historically associated with bureaucratic 
authoritarian regimes. 
Self Employment Tends to be inherently precarious and often 
includes small-scale commodity producers, 
such as family farmers or shopkeepers. The 
direct producer employs him/herself and ekes 
out a living through narrow price differentials 
between inputs and outputs 
Household This includes child rearing and other 
household activities such as food preparation. 
Such activities are not given a monetary 
value in official statistics. 
Casual Earnings are extralegal and are based on one-
off transactions that are not cumulative or 
continuous. 
Peasant Typically tenant farmers who are subordinate 
to a dominant class who extract the surplus 
produced. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 On the history of the ‘fear of the mass’, see Balibar (1993). Policy analyses from the RAND-corporation have 
drawn similar conclusions (Nichiporuk 2000). 
2 In the ‘third image’ the state is treated as a unitary actor that is autonomous from civil society and the state 
system is understood in terms of the balance of power and capability of such unitary actors (Waltz 1979). 
3 For similar analyses to Bayat concerned with other parts of the world, see Moser (2004), Beall (2002), Beall, 
Crankshaw and Parnell (2000), Perlman (2002) and (2003). 
4 This is the modified typology presented in Harrod (2006), which varies from the 1987 typology, reflecting 
empirical changes in the world economy as well as dissatisfaction by Harrod over the terminology used in the 
1987 version. 
5 Although Davies and Ryner (2006b) is one attempt to update the analysis it is primarily concerned with 
questions of theory and concept formation. 
6 Self employment tends to be associated with anti-statism (taxes threaten their profit margins), but not 
necessarily radical individualism. To stabilise markets the self-employed have tended to organise cartels, 
cooperative marketing and finance groups.  Hence, self employment is associated with an 
oscillation/combination of a rugged individualist image with organised self defence, which has generated a 
disposition towards populist politics based on a direct relationship with a ‘strong leader’ not inhibited by 
bureaucratic intermediaries (Cox 1987: 52-55). 
7 The desperate struggle for survival makes casuals highly instrumental in pursuing opportunities to secure 
material subsistence, yet they are simultaneously disposed towards millennialist projects. Harrod (1987, 2006) 
explains this as the result of the absence of a concrete personified ‘other’ (like a factory owner or boss) in the 
more diffuse power relations that they confront, inviting more metaphysical explanations of their plight, which 
can be combined with a complete and violent rejection of the present and an affirmation of a utopian future in 
future history or in a life beyond. 
8 80 percent of Tunisian exports and 70 percent of imports are with the EU. The EU is the source of 90 percent 
of tourist receipt and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Tunisia. In addition, foreign exchange inflows from 
remittances by the 600 000 Tunisians residing in the EU were in 1995 equivalent to 3-4 percent of Tunisian 
GDP. 
9 On the Uruguay Round, its effect on the Lomé Convention and the neoliberalisation of the relationship 
between the EU and the former colonies of its member states, see Hurt (2003). 
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10 The proportion of the working population in agriculture has decreased in Tunisia from 41 percent in 1966, to 
32.5 percent in 1974 and 21 percent in 1994 (Calculations based on ILO, 2007). 
11 ‘Praetorian’ is a reference to the ‘Praetorian Guards’ of imperial Rome, which provided an autonomous 
coercive power base for the Emperor. The Praetorian Guards swore a personal allegiance to the emperor in 
exchange for personal patrimony, and their own internal unity and cohesion depended on a self-referential esprit 
d’corps. It is suggested that Arab elites have exercised a similar form of authority in MENA since the 7th 
century. 
12 See Deutsch et. al. (1957). 
13 According to Volpi none of these conceptions embrace democracy without caveats. Liberal democracy entails 
certain commitments to individual rights that ‘trump’ majority rule. In the same way, republican and Islamic 
conceptions have certain, communal rather than individualistic, non-negotiable conceptions that ‘trump’ 
majority rule. 
14 Winch pointed to the over-determined relations between language and material life, rendering the base-
structure distinction meaningless. On the contingent articulation of social subjectivities through a ‘logic of the 
symbolic’ that does not follow the ‘literal logic’ of the base-superstructure model, see Laclau (1988). 
